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ABSTRACT 
 
The South China Sea became  in a short time-span quickly heavy 
militarized. American and Chinese warships are increasingly 
active in these contested waters. While the G.W. Bush 
administration focused militarily mostly on the Middle East, 
Obama re-shifted with the ‘pivot to Asia’ significant military 
attention to East Asia. This study aims to clarify to what extent 
Obama legitimized the military component in the pivot through 
securitization, as proposed by the Copenhagen School. 
Therefore, several American and Chinese policy documents and 
speeches are analyzed. The results indicate that, contrary to what 
the administration claimed, military policies were predominant 
in the pivot and ‘extraordinary measures’ compared to pre-
existing policies. Furthermore, the Obama administration 
securitized Chinese policies regarding the South China Sea by 
portraying them as threatening U.S. security, and thus 
exceptional measures are required. In successfully securitizing 
the issue, the administration constructed a reality in which 
Beijing would have to respond, perceiving Washington uplifting 
the issue to a ‘top security issue’ as credible. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
For many years, China did manage to ‘rise peacefully’. Its vast economic development 
came without the by western scholars anticipated Sino-American clash (Mearsheimer, 2010). 
Under the tenure of G.W. Bush, the United States and China developed a complex, but pragmatic 
working-relationship.  One could argue, that balance changed during Obama’s first term as 
president. After one year in office he billed himself ‘America’s first Pacific president’, subtly 
suggesting that the Bush administration paid too little attention to the Asian continent and that the 
U.S. should restore their engagement within the region (Allen, 2009). However, tension spiked in 
the years that followed, over China’s regional behavior in area’s such as the South China Sea 
(Lieberthal, 2011). Over the course of 2010 and 2011 the U.S. made it increasingly more clear 
that Beijing had little support to expect from the U.S. in the developing disputes between China 
and its neighbors. Eventually, the disputed area of the South China Sea quickly militarized and 
became a highly sensitive issue, with several scholars predicting large conflict (Mearsheimer, 
2010).   
In 2011 state secretary Hillary Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy called 
‘America’s Pacific Century’, which if often marked as the embarking of the so called ‘pivot’ or 
‘rebalance’ to Asia. In her article, she emphasized the need for increased military presence and 
explicitly mentioned freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (Clinton, 2011a). The pivot 
contained various components, ranging from economy to military. However, much debate has 
taken place whether the military component was predominant. In any case, this military re-
balance by the U.S. was met with caution by China, whom started perceiving the whole pivot 
strategy as an attempt by the U.S. to restraint China. Scholars have argued that this increase in 
military did antagonize China (Ford, 2017).   
 This change in military strategy by the U.S. needed legitimization to the public. Why was 
America re-directing its military towards Asia? This process has been described by the 
Copenhagen School as ‘securitization’: claiming an issue as a security issue - when done by 
security-providing actors -,  makes it so. Therefore, exceptional measures are allowed (Wæver, 
1993). This research will use this specific lens when looking at the ‘pivot to Asia’, since it 
addresses American China-policies from an unique, constructivist angle. It focuses on how 
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Obama legitimized his military policies and how this may have constructed a new reality. This 
evidently leads to the following research question: how did the securitization of China’s South 
China Sea policy by the Obama administration in the ‘pivot to Asia’ affect Sino-American 
military relations? This research deliberately chose to focus on policies regarding the South 
China Sea, since it is a highly militarized and contested area. To address this question thoroughly 
the succeeding sub-questions are formulated: (1) To what extent were security measures 
predominant in the pivot to Asia and were these significantly different from pre-existing policies? 
(2) How did the U.S. legitimize the military component in the pivot to Asia and how was this 
message perceived by its audience? (3) How did China respond militarily to the securitized 
measures in the pivot?  
 To determine the scope of the securitization, this research will include governmental 
statements, speeches and policy papers by the Obama administration in its analyses. It will focus 
on the two terms of President Obama, since the pivot to Asia emerged in his first and continued 
in his second term. Furthermore, this research includes Chinese primary and secondary sources, 
since it aims to analyze whether China reacts within that constructed reality. By analyzing U.S. 
documents from the commencement of the so-called pivot until the end of Obama’s second term, 
this thesis is able to give a concise trend analysis in American foreign policy discourse related to 
China and how this was answered by Beijing.  
The case of the pivot of Asia is illustrative for the American foreign policy during 
Obama. The U.S. withdrew their attention from the Middle East and re-focused on the Pacific. 
Scholars have argued that the pivot was Obama’s biggest mistake in foreign policy (Ford, 2017), 
while others have stated the likelihood of the situation in the South China Sea developing into a 
Sino-American war (Kaplan, 2011). This thesis will refrain from political judgement, but merely 
illustrates to what extent the possible securitization created the current reality. 
Ultimately, the aim of this thesis is threefold: contributing to the existing body of 
literature on securitization theory, academically analyze U.S. policy in regard to the South China 
Sea and trigger an scholarly debate to what extent securitization in foreign policy might lead to 
counter-responses (thus creates a new reality). The composition of this thesis is as follows: first 
this thesis discusses in chapter 2 the literature concerning the pivot to Asia, adopted by the 
Obama administration. Furthermore it explains how this specific angle contributes to the body of 
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literature. In Chapter 3 the theoretical foundation is explained and discussed. Chapter 4 discusses 
the methodology, including the research design and case selection. Chapter 5, the main body of 
the thesis, entails all three sub questions. By drawing from the work in all the previous ones, 
Chapter 6 is able to conclude on this thesis’s research question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ivo Leijten 
 THE PACIFIC PRESIDENT 
 
 
8 
 
CHAPTER 2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Context of the pivot to Asia 
 Barack Obama entered office in a complex time internationally for the United 
States. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a demand for greater emphasis on domestic 
issues. However, many states in the Pacific region felt a stronger leading role for the U.S. was 
required (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). Various state-leaders expressed that the U.S. had ignored 
South East Asian interests for too long (Manyin, Daggett, Dolven, Lawrence, Martin, O’Rourke 
& Vaugh, 2012). In his ‘re-balance’, Obama rhetorically distanced himself from the prior 
administration in its Pacific policies (Allen, 2009).  
In the years that preceded, China had undergone some significant changes. The under Hu 
Jintao embraced ‘Peaceful Rise’ strategy had avoided any significant conflicts by China while the 
country steadily grew in power, wealth and military might (Ross, 2012). While the first Bush 
administration was focused on other issues (9/11 and the succeeding War on Terror), the second 
did manage to establish some remarkable results in Asia; he reduced Sino-Taiwan tensions and 
started talks that later resulted in TPP (Ford, 2017). Sino-American relations under Bush were 
also complicated, but they were rather stable and balanced; for example, scholars have used the 
term ‘dual clarity’ for the Taiwan issue, trading a ban on force from the mainland by China for no 
proclamation of independence by Taiwan (Wenzao, 2004). Obama inherited a rather complex, 
but stable situation in the Asia Pacific.    
2.2 The pivot and its implications 
Starting as early as 2009, Sino-American relations quickly soured. Incidents with 
neighboring countries, China backing out the Climate Agreement and the leaked American 
AirSea Battle strategy, all contributed to a rapid cooling relationship (Ross, 2012). However, 
rhetorically Obama remained cautious to provoke Beijing and vice versa.  
In 2011 the U.S. shifted its Asia-approach. The article America’s Pacific Century in 
Foreign Diplomacy by then State Secretary Hillary Clinton is often cited as centerpiece in 
relation to this new strategy. She projected Asia-Pacific as pivotal for the U.S. interest in the 
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coming years. The region had become “a key driver for world politics” and Asia’s growth and 
dynamism was “crucial for the economic and strategic interests of the United States” (Clinton, 
2011a). The strategy entailed ‘forward-deployed’ diplomacy, reassuring commitment to the entire 
continent in open, stable and prospering relations. The U.S. asked an active commitment from 
their friends in the region, so that all countries can work together to address regional and global 
challenges. The pivot, or ‘rebalance’, to Asia-Pacific was founded upon six pillars: strengthening 
existing alliances, improving relations with emerging powers, generating economic prosperity, 
establishing multinational institutions, promoting universal values and increasing military 
presence (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). Academic literature agrees on the fact that the pivot is 
unique in its ‘whole-of-government’ approach (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). The aim is a 
strategy on all six components and is thus supposed to be carried by several ministries. However, 
there is no denying in what aspect of the pivot gathered the majority of attention in existing 
literature. As Brimley and Ratner (2013) point out, the focus on the military component is evident 
in both the media and academic work. Whether this reflects reality is contested by scholars, but 
this is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 The pivot to Asia by the Obama administration has been widely discussed among 
academics. Much debate circled around the question whether the ‘Obama doctrine’ continued its 
‘deep engagement’ with China or switched to restraint (Löfflman, 2016). This thesis addresses 
both stances. First, many realist thinkers argue that China has changed its course around 2009 by 
assertive behavior and bold rhetoric. Therefore, the U.S. should increase its naval force to be able 
to deter China (Forbes & Talent, 2015). They see a Sino-American ‘zero-sum game’ as almost 
inevitable (Logan, 2013) and therefore call upon containing China (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
Containment is a foreign policy doctrine directed to stop the expansion of an enemy. Although 
that strategy originally dates back to the Cold War era, the debate regained attention with the 
implemented pivot (Li, 2016). According to Mearsheimer (2010), continued Chinese economic 
growth would definitely mean that Beijing strived for regional hegemony, dominating Japan and 
South-Korea (Logan, 2013). These authors tend to forget two things: first, it is far too dangerous 
to engage with China militarily, since the potential costs are huge, as pointed out by Shambaugh 
(1996). Secondly, Sino-American trade is one of the largest bilateral ones. Therefore, both 
countries depend on each other economically (Tellis, 2013). Hence, this thesis argues it is 
unlikely that the pivot is a concealed strategy to contain China.  
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   Secondly, others have argued the pivot is a grand strategy by Obama to deeply engage 
China in a web of American dominated international institutions, often referred to as ‘liberal 
institutionalists’ (Logan, 2013). It is found on the premise that the U.S. cannot clog China’s rise, 
but should therefore secure China’s behavior through international institutions (Ikenberry, 2012). 
However, also this view is rejected by this thesis, since it assumes a military balance in the region 
too easily. Since a possibly crucial part of the pivot are military measures, it would be wrong to 
assume China would be at peace with U.S. military domination in the region, especially in 
contested areas such as the South China Sea (Logan, 2013).    
This thesis argues that the third line of argumentation, described as ‘balancing’, regarding 
the pivot is most fitting. On one hand the U.S. is economically profiting from a prosperous China, 
on the other it is aiming to militarily constrain China of threatening interests of the U.S. or its 
allies (Tellis, 2013). Also Löfflman (2016) describes the balancing relationship Washington and 
Beijing conduct. This ‘two-edged sword’ can be problematic in the sense that pushing one side to 
hard can result in losses in the other (Etzioni, 2013).  
However, academic literature fails to provide an analysis on how Obama is wielding that 
so-called sword. Specifically, how is Obama legitimizing military measures that some perceive as 
anti-Chinese (Campbell & Andrews, 2013), while maintaining a constructive relationship 
economically. Most scholars have addressed the pivot through a realist lens of power-relations. 
Therefore, this thesis approaches the existing gap in the literature through the theory of 
securitization. It potentially explains how Obama is able to use Chinese military policies in the 
South China Sea as threats to legitimize his own military policies, entailed within the pivot. By 
constructing a reality in which Chinese policies regarding the South China Sea are securitized 
(made into a security issue), the Obama administration potentially created the groundwork of 
Beijing’s reaction within that same reality. Other than assessing the pivot as grand strategy, this 
thesis analyzes how Obama securitized one part (military) of that strategy.     
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CHAPTER 3 Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Theoretical foundations 
In this section, the deeper theoretical foundation is outlined. It will first give an overview 
of where securitization theoretically derives from and how this relates to this specific issue. 
Furthermore, it will give a detailed analysis on the contemporary body of literature on 
securitization theory and elaborate more on specific issues within securitization theory relevant 
for this thesis. It should be noted that it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all 
concepts in detail. It is merely the aim to link relevant conceptualizations and ideas within these 
ideologies to securitization.   
3.1.1 Constructivism 
 The most logical start to analyze securitization theory is constructivism. Constructivism 
has become a more prominent ideology in IR studies since the 1980s. It draws from various 
disciplines such as sociology and critical studies, by arguing that the world around us is 
constructed socially through intersubjective interaction (McDonald, 2008). Both agent and 
structure are mutually confirmed as constructed. Norms, values and ideas are crucial to determine 
the current state of world politics. Apart from the Copenhagen School which is discussed later, 
constructivists did not work dedicate much of their work to security studies. Unsurprisingly, the 
shared approach among constructivists about security is that it is socially constructed (McDonald, 
2008). Thus, security then can be understood as protectionary contour around the values shared 
by a certain group. But what these values are and how they are protected is context dependent 
(McDonald, 2002). Security arises through interaction by actors about these issues. In this claim, 
one can hear the echo of uncertainty about the other’s intentions. The perception of regional 
security in the Pacific Asia, is dependent on the interaction between Washington and Beijing.  
Speech act theory 
 To fully understand the emergence and traditions of securitization theory, a more 
elaborate overview of its founding is needed. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
fully address speech act theory as proposed by Austin and Searle. Consequently, in this paragraph 
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a brief overview is given of the main foundational features and how this developed into the idea 
of securitization.  
 A speech act is a process in which intersubjective messages are passed on. It analyzes 
how issues or concepts can be perceived as constant, while this was generated through 
intersubjective processes. A speech act is a “concrete action that is completed or being stated” 
(Mutimer, 2007). It is based on the concept of performative utterances by Austin (1962), arguing 
that speech act utterances have not only the ability to describe, but also to create reality. 
Furthermore, the performative utterance exists outside the dichotomy of true or false, or as Austin 
puts it “truth conditions”. Instead, the performative utterance is subject to felicity conditions 
(felicitous or infelicitous) depending whether the utterances are requests (‘Can you stop 
interfering with my business?’), declarations (‘Our state is at war’) or warning (‘If you do not 
stop doing that, there will be consequences’). In applying Austin to security studies, it becomes 
no longer the question if a speech act is true (or not), but what the speech act does (Stritzel, 
2007). Therefore, if Obama stresses that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is crucial 
to the U.S. national security, he warns possible perpetrators and thus creates that reality, whether 
American security was in fact endangered or not.  
3.2 Copenhagen School & Securitization theory 
 In this section the current state of the academic debate concerning securitization theory is 
discussed and outlined. Furthermore this part will address various critiques by scholars in favor 
and opposing the applicability of securitization theory. This section will include the most recent 
work by several scholars proposing various pathways towards a demarcated securitization theory. 
However, this thesis acknowledges the previous difficulties within the academic securitization 
debate. It does by no means claim to have invented the right form of the theory, but merely aims 
to re-open the discussion in applying both widely accepted assumptions and more contested 
elements within the theory.  
3.2.1 Brief history of securitization theory 
The Copenhagen School (CS) was a name attributed to several scholars around Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. The core within the 
‘school’ is the idea that security relates to world politics. They advocated to enlarge the 
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interstate-conflict dominated security agendas with issues such as human rights, poverty and 
climate change. It does not aim to define security as such, but rather looks to what effect security 
has on intersubjective processes. Securitization as first proposed by Wæver (1993), was the 
process in which an actor declares an issue, object or other actor an ‘existential threat’ to its own 
continuation. If this message is accepted by the audience, regular politics or regulations are 
suspended to be replaced by extraordinary measures to address the perceived threat (Wæver, 
1993). The CS adopted a constructivist view that security arises from the negotiation between 
speaker and audience. Threats are articulated in the form of ‘speech acts’ which is discussed 
more extensively in the previous paragraph. Thus, if Obama can credibly convey the message to 
the American public that China’s South China Sea policies are an existential threat, his 
administration is enabled to respond outside the realm of ordinary politics.  
The Copenhagen School further conceptualized the theory by defining the process as: 
‘through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to 
treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent 
and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 491). The theory is 
founded on three ‘facilitating conditions’ that determine the success of the securitization: 
contexts (including the form of the speech act), position of the speaker and historical conditions 
associated with threat (Wæver, 2000). Speech acts were defined as securitizing moves (Buzan, 
1998). However the concept can be applied to other actors than states, the theory has been most 
often been used to describe the decisions by governmental elites, which will be further discussed 
at the next part of this chapter. As displayed in Figure 1, an issue can range from non-political 
(no part of the public debate) to politicized (part of the public debate) to securitized (perceived as 
existential threat) (Buzan, et al., 1998). Politicizing a subject would be to state its importance to 
society and put effort in making it part of the public political debate. This is therefore different 
from securitizing, where it is claimed that the subject is an existential threat and should be dealt 
with in an extraordinary measure. Therefore it can be argued that if securitization succeeds, the 
issue moves beyond politics (and is no longer political). Thus, security is the extension of politics 
(Hansen, 2012).    
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Figure 1. Spectrum of politicizing   
 
 
 
      Non-politicized     Politicized     Securitized 
 
3.2.2 Criticisms & refutations 
 However, the theory in this form has received a seemingly endless stream of critique. As 
Taureck (2006) outlines, they focus around three basic positions: (1) the acclaimed absence of a 
normative analysis of securitization within the analytical framework of the theory and (2) the 
current utility of the theory and the applicability of the framework in total and (3) the alleged 
consequences of wielding securitization theory. Taureck (2006) responds to the claim of absence 
of moral/ethical norms within the realm of the theory. Most crucially, the critique is in the claim 
that the analyst can never be neutral in examining security, but rather co-constitutes a new 
political reality by choosing to write about specific themes. Therefore, with this confirmation, the 
analyst would be co-responsible for this newly created reality. Huysmans (1995) concludes that 
this is inherent in constructivist approaches to security issues; the ‘normative dilemma of 
speaking security’. This thesis would embrace the argumentation by Wæver (2000) that the 
analyst being political or not is subservient; the political choice is already made by the 
securitizing actor and whether the analyst agrees or not is irrelevant. Therefore, this thesis argues 
in favor of Taureck (2006) that normative criticism in securitization might be incommensurable. 
A simple description of security issues is most likely to have a normative component thus it 
would be better to acknowledge these concerns. Indeed, writing on the possible securitization by 
Washington, can contribute to that reality, but that responsibility is with the actor rather than the 
author. However, securitization does, as Wæver (2000) also acknowledges, create a 
responsibility. Since, if accepted, it would provide the securitizing actor with deontic powers. As 
Balzacq (2015) points out, this deontic power extends beyond speech act alone if it does create a 
new reality. Furthermore, the responsibility would not merely be ascribing an effect to an actor; if 
the securitization process leads to crisis, both the audience as the securitizing actor would be to 
blame. In other words, if indeed the Obama administration securitized China’s policies and 
responded militarily beyond the realm of normal politics, for example by unnecessary armament 
Outside the realm 
of politics 
Outside the realm 
of politics 
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or provocations to Beijing, and it would indeed lead to conflict, both the administration as the 
audience were a driving force.  
 Stritzel (2007) focusses his writing on the second position of critique. He calls for a 
greater emphasis on the externalist component within the theory, namely the issue of 
embeddedness. Articulations of security need to be analyzed within their broader discursive 
context, from which the securitizing actor extracts its performative force. This research would 
embrace the condition that the speech act itself only has the ability to construct a new reality 
when its context allows it to. Therefore, securitization has a socio-linguistic and a socio-political 
component. Stritzel (2007) proposes a model of analysis consisting of  three central layers: (1) 
the performative force of uttered threats, (2) their embeddedness in existing discourses and (3) 
the positional power of actors able to affect the consequences. In sum, the new framework 
proposes a less emphasis on the linguist component, but more on the socio-political aspect and 
contextual sphere. Therefore, this thesis takes the existing Sino-American military relationship 
into account as well as other contextual developments. It is important to analyze the relation 
Obama inherited from preceding governments.  
 
 The last category of critique is about the consequences of securitization theory. Balzacq 
(2005) uses the term perlocutionary effects to describe the effects of constructing the new reality 
for the perceiving audience. As Hayes (2013) also states in his book, the audience fulfills a 
crucial role in this process. Three elements – selection, legitimation, and implementation of 
extreme measures – all have real-world consequences. These consequences can go as far as a 
declaration of war (Balzacq, 2008). However, the securitizing move always has an intended 
target audience that should accept the action. Balzacq (2005) further examined the concept of 
audience within securitizing. The importance of the audience is dependent on three factors, 
according to Balzacq (2015): (1) the frame of reference, (2) its willingness to be convinced, 
which is linked to the perceived credibility of the securitizing actor and (3) the capability to grant 
or deny a mandate to the securitizing actor. However, this conceptualization is yet too vague and 
has to be examined further. At the same time, it is crucial to take into the equation. Some scholars 
have argued to leave the audience out as element since it is “not an analytical concept at all, but 
rather a normative concept in analytical disguise” (Floyd, 2011) but  this thesis argues in line 
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with Balzacq (2015) that, however vague, it is crucial within the theory. As he puts it: “keeping 
the assumption of audience assent in securitization theory bears difficult inference obstacles. But, 
at the same time, dropping it would be fatal to the process”. However, the literature fails to 
provide for a clear-cut definition of what the audience is and what it should be. In showing the 
effect the audience had on accepting policies, one might conclude the audience is an active agent 
rather than a passive recipient. Audiences in academic literature are often the people (or 
electorate) of a state, branches of government and sometimes organizations, specific groups 
within society or states themselves. Due to the scope of this thesis, it will stick to examining one 
audience capable of granting a mandate (the American public). In this research, all three of 
Balzacq’s (2015) factors are taken into account, when analyzing the audience. However, this 
thesis strongly encourages other scholars to further define the ‘right’ audience when looking at 
securitization processes.  
 
3.2.3 Summarizing  
 This section has discussed the body of literature on securitization by analyzing its various 
criticisms and refutations. In weighing the most fruitful contributions to the theory, this thesis has 
outlined a applicable lens to look at this specific issue. In sum, securitization theory as proposed 
by the CS is criticized on different accounts, widely varying in contributing value to the domain. 
This thesis argues similar to Balzaqc (2015) that securitization theory has a core construct on 
which most scholars agree on. However, much like a realm of thought as realism, each utterance 
of the theory should be judged on its own account.  Whether a specific adaptation is applicable is 
dependent on the scientific structure. Nevertheless, this thesis argues in favor of setting the stone 
carved core assumptions so that this thesis can contribute to the domain in building on previous 
work. The following three features can be derived from the body of literature discussed 
previously: 
 
 Threats, when perceived as credible, have the ability to shape a new reality 
 The perception of the threat is dependent on both agent and audience 
 The new reality only exists within its context 
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These three rather broad formulated features are important to note for every utterance of the 
theory. Naturally, there are most likely also scholars that would debate these three features, but 
these form the core of the theory as proposed by Wæver and Buzan. Balzacq (2015) attempted to 
combine these basic assumptions with an ideal type of the theory as is presented in Table 1. 
These findings collide with the key concepts this thesis has discussed above and will use in 
regard to its research. 
 
Table 1. An ideal type of securitization.  
 
Note: Reprinted from “The Essence of securitization; Theory, ideal type and a sociological science of security” by T. 
Balzacq, 2015, International Relations, 29, p.106  
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CHAPTER 4 Methodology 
 In this chapter this thesis discusses its methodological approach to the research. It firstly 
will discuss the design of its research plan, interlinking all sub-questions which would result in an 
answer to the main question. Secondly, it discusses the data that is going to be analyzed for each 
sub-question. Lastly, this thesis discusses how the data will be analyzed and interpreted.  
4.1 The research design 
 This research will approach the pivot to Asia through the lens of securitization: how did 
Obama legitimize the military component? In Chapter 3 this thesis has discussed thoroughly the 
theoretical foundation of securitization. In this research, the potentially securitizing actor is the 
Obama administration, the perceived threat are policies by China regarding the South China Sea 
and the response at hand is the military component of the pivot to Asia. Lastly, the audience in 
this equation is the American public which has to accept Obama’s military emphasis on the Asia 
Pacific rather than the Middle East for example.  
 In the first sub-question this thesis analyzes to what extent the military component is 
predominant in the pivot. If military policies solely encompasses a minor part within the pivot, it 
is unlikely that this specific part is securitized and other components are not. It is pivotal to 
analyze whether the military component is indeed extraordinary, or rather an expansion of pre-
existing policies. In the case of solely a continuation of years of work, one cannot categorize it as 
extraordinary and therefore securitized. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) argue accordingly 
that a securitized issue for a longer period of time becomes a politicized security issue and falls 
back in the realm of normal politics. Therefore, the military component has to be predominant 
and significantly different compared to existing policies for the issue to be securitized. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, scholars differ on this matter. This thesis aims to analyze what 
efforts have been made by the administration of Obama within the re-balance to Asia, but maybe 
even more what results were generated from that efforts. This requires a policy analysis on the 
military efforts within the pivot, but also a historical overview of the legacy Obama inherited 
from previous administrations and how bilateral military relations during Obama’s terms 
developed. 
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 In the second sub-question, this thesis discusses how the securitizing actor legitimized its 
extraordinary measures, via speech acts or ‘performative utterances’. Therefore, a case-selection 
is used and discussed later in this chapter. In analyzing the threats, the three layers proposed by 
Stritzel (2007) are utilized. Moreover, this thesis leaves room for an analysis and interpretation 
on the meaning of the performative utterances (speech acts by the Obama administration) to the 
audience (American public). Policy language can remain deliberately vague, but it is pivotal to 
decompose the speech acts to their core meaning.   
Lastly, it is vital to determine whether securitizing China’s policies, in fact did create a 
new reality in which Obama’s Chinese counterpart is required to react. Therefore, the third and 
last will focus on accumulative results of the threats and how Beijing responded within that 
constructed reality. Thus, giving a similar historical analysis as done for sub question 1, on the 
People’s Liberation Army (Navy) and the military policies that followed the pivot. Hence, this 
section will use primary and secondary sources to subscribe that analysis. It is important to note 
that Beijing is less transparent about military expenditure and strategic policy than Washington, 
thus this thesis is dependent on a small number of sources available. Nonetheless, if Beijing 
interprets the speech act by the Obama administration as credible, it might prove a successful 
securitization. After all, if Beijing does not act within the reality constructed by the Obama 
administration, the securitization was not perceived credible, thus even if that reality was created 
for its intended audience (the American public), it does not constitute reality. As discussed 
earlier, whether the issue is true or not does not matter for the process of securitization, but it 
does matter for world affairs (Stritzel, 2007). 
4.2 The case-selection 
 Since securitization is a complex process entailing various objects, facilitating conditions 
and actors, diversity in the selected cases is beneficial to give a complete depiction of the 
American stance towards China’s policies in the South China Sea. In this dynamic, securitization 
theory is a suitable theory since it explains how military developments in the region are 
potentially exploited and framed as threats to a constructed security. The Pacific region is one of 
the most militarized regions in the world which generates the question how this process is 
legitimized.  
Ivo Leijten 
 THE PACIFIC PRESIDENT 
 
 
20 
 
 The cases are selected through the above mentioned criteria and with the premise of 
diversified formats: speech acts, governmental publications and media-outlets. Since it analyzes 
military relations most sources (however not all) are policy papers by the Department of Defense 
(DoD). The cases are selected on the bases that the actors are enabled through their position to 
speak on the relevant affairs and actors. Please find a selection of some of the main sources in 
Appendix A. 
4.3 Discourse analysis 
The CS makes its stance quite clear in stating that securitization is studied through discourse 
analysis (Buzan et al., 1998). Also, CS lets the exact form of the analysis up to the scholar. 
Therefore, it is the responsibility of the author to determine a less fluid approach to the cases, by 
setting the perimeters of the analysis. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) argue, especially for 
qualitative research, there is no set procedure for the production of material or analysis. Instead 
the researched should be custom-made to the specific characteristic of the project. Most 
importantly, this thesis argues in line with the previously discussed Stritzel (2006), including 
power, embeddedness and position of the threat or actor in the analysis. This thesis will 
specifically research linguistic features that construct the discourse and its meaning. In American 
policy the concept of ‘national security’ is not solely a linguistic construct, but also carries a 
contextual weight in itself, which is also referred to as the performative force (Buzan et al., 
1998). Furthermore, to approach the cases from position of equality, the following guiding 
questions are used in the analysis: 
 Who is the securitizing actor? 
 What is the positional power of the securitizing actor? 
 Does the text entail the concept of security? If so, whose security? 
 Is that security threatened and thus are urgent measures required? 
 How is the issue embedded in existing discourse? 
 To what extent did the threat contribute in constructing a new reality discourse? 
 Are there extraordinary measures taken? 
Lastly, it is important to note that social reality cannot be completely captured within discourse 
analysis, since many social practices are non-discursive (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002). 
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Consequently, this thesis cannot claim a complete analysis on social relations, but merely the 
trend how discourse contributed in realization of a new reality.  
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CHAPTER 5 Case study: the ‘Pivot to Asia’ 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, this thesis addresses the main questions of this thesis. It uses the pivot to 
Asia as case-study, to analyze military policies through securitization and draw conclusions on 
the Obama administrations. This thesis aims to grasp a better understanding of Obama’s East 
Asia military policies and place them in a historical context. As mentioned earlier, the main 
question is approached via three sub-questions. Each of the three questions contributes to a better 
understanding and improves the ability to draw conclusions on the main research question.  
5.2 Sub-Question 1:   
To what extent were security measures predominant in the pivot to Asia and were these 
significantly different from pre-existing policies? 
The pivot to Asia as outlined by Hillary Clinton in her article in Foreign Policy had six 
pillars which would result in a rebalance to Asia. Those are respectively: strengthening existing 
alliances, improving relations with emerging powers, generating economic prosperity, 
establishing multinational institutions, promoting universal values and increasing military 
presence (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). However, various scholars argue that one aspect, the 
increasing of U.S. military presence, was predominant over the others. Conversely, others have 
argued that the military component is overexposed throughout media outlets and academic work 
(Brimley and Ratner, 2013). As militarization is directly linked to the realm of security, it is 
important to note to what extent this took place. The underlying question is whether the policies 
implemented under the pivot were a significant break from pre-existing policies by previous 
administrations. Therefore, this thesis first outlines a brief history of military presence and 
strategy in the region and includes a contextual analysis.  
5.2.1 History of U.S. military and strategy in the Asia-Pacific 
 The Asia-Pacific has been crucial to the U.S. defense strategy for decades. Just before 
World War II, the U.S. started its foreign policy strategy of establishing military bases all over 
the world. A strategy which is meant to signal a warning and demonstrate the military capabilities 
of the U.S., while asserting military influence in the region it is established (Lutz & Enloe, 2009). 
Ivo Leijten 
 THE PACIFIC PRESIDENT 
 
 
23 
 
After the Cold War, the US’ military focus shifted from the Asia Pacific to the Middle East, 
which led to a decrease in military presence in the region. Much of the military personnel in 
Europe and Asia were withdrawn and sent to the Middle East (Appendix B). In 2005, twice as 
much troops were in the Middle East as in the other regions. Appendix s B and C show clearly 
how Bush continued the trend of a decreasing military presence in Asia since the 1960s.  
However, when entering a new era, strategic objectives changed. These changes are well 
documented in the Global Defense Posture Review of 2004. It emphasizes the importance of the 
U.S. forward presence of military forces overseas. Since the Department remains uncertain about 
possible risks, the U.S. national security “requires bases within and beyond Western Europe”. 
Key themes are to expand existing alliances and build new partnerships, create greater 
operational flexibility, focus on all areas of the world, develop fast deployable capabilities and 
update the existing military capabilities (USA Department of Defense, 2004).  
 G.W. Bush’ foreign policy was evidently dominated by 9/11. In years that followed, Bush 
(intentional or not) got dragged into a spiral of events that led to the war in Afghanistan and 
invasion in Iraq. During his administrations, the absolute amount of military spending was 
increased each year (Appendix D and E). In the National Security Strategy of 2002 it is stated 
that “the war against terrorism has proven that America’s alliances in Asia not only underpin 
regional peace and stability, but are flexible and ready to deal with new challenges” (Bush, 2002 
p. 26). On China, Bush states the following: 
The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote 
 a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a 
 strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of China is crucial 
 to that future. Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst 
 features of the Communist legacy, China’s leaders have not yet made the next series of 
 fundamental choices about the character of their state. In pursuing advanced military 
 capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following 
 an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In 
 time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that greatness. 
 (Bush, 2002, p. 27) 
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It is interesting to note that in the midst of an invasion in another region, President Bush does not 
shrink from using strong language in regard to the Chinese militarization. Furthermore, 
criticizing China in pursuing advanced military capabilities carries an assumption of bias, since 
U.S. allies such as South-Korea followed the same trajectory, supported by Washington. He later 
emphasizes successful bilateral cooperation on several transnational issues between the U.S. and 
China, but then continues:  
There are, however, other areas in which we have profound disagreements. Our 
commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act is one. Human 
rights is another. We expect China to adhere to its nonproliferation commitments. We will 
work to narrow differences where they exist, but not allow them to preclude cooperation 
where we agree. (p. 28) 
Wenzao (2004) wrote that the Taiwan issue was the most crucial one in Sino-American relations 
under Bush. In that respect, he created a contested, but stable trade-off, referred to as ‘dual 
deterrence’: no use of force by China and no proclamation of independence by Taiwan. Stuart 
(2012) adds by saying Bush was more pragmatic in regard to Taiwan compared to Carter or 
Reagan. As long as the balance remained, he might be optimistic that China could play a role in a 
post-Soviet international order. In sum, Bush had a complex but relatively stable relationship 
with China.  
5.2.2 Implemented policies in the pivot 
 As noted earlier, the pivot was unique in the sense that it proposed ‘a complete package’ 
strategy for the region. Scholars have claimed that the military component was the predominant 
factor in the pivot (Xiang, 2012; Manyin et al., 2012). This section analyzes to what extent these 
policies where dominant and if they were significantly different from those of the previous 
administration. 
As mentioned, the military part of the pivot was at least the most visible and the most 
highlighted in academic work and the media. The tone was set from the start in 2011, when 
Obama held a speech in front of the Australian Parliament, stating: “I have directed my national 
security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, 
reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the expense of the 
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Asia-Pacific” (Obama, 2011). It is unsurprising that the U.S. felt threatened in their military 
hegemony within the region, since China had an annual average growth of 11.8% in military 
spending and is suspected to surpass the U.S. in defense spending by 2035 as shown in Figure 2 
(although that percentage recent years has been reduced to around 7%) (Brimley & Ratner, 
2013).  
Figure 2. Projected military spending China and the U.S.   
 
 
Note: Reprinted from “San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot toward Asia” by D. Stuart, 2012, Asian  Affairs: An 
American Review, 39:4 p. 207 
 
The American Congress reported, that much of the pivot was a continuation of previous policies, 
but there are some rather strong changes in the military sphere. To increase military presence 
Obama announced a new troop deployment of 2,500 men in Australia, a navy vessels rotation in 
Singapore and an intensified military cooperation with the Philippines (Pennington, 2012; 
Manyin et al., 2012). As Congress also writes, this number of force is relatively small, especially 
when compared with the troops deployed in the Middle East. Furthermore, Appendix F gives a 
selection of military cooperation efforts executed by the U.S. and several regional states, but also 
these are relative minor issues. According to Shambaugh (2013), the rationale for this small scale 
measures on the short scale is the following: as mentioned, the U.S. military was already well-
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established in the region, long before the Bush administration. Despite China’s rapid military 
modernization, the U.S. still far outreaches China in terms of military resources (Stuart, 2012). 
Thus, the renewed military presence and bilateral military cooperation by Washington in the 
region is hardly revolutionary, but rather a relative shift.  
In the policy paper Strategic Guidance by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) (2012) 
it is proposed to minimize possible budget cuts in the Navy, but rather reduce spending on the 
Army Ground Forces. That is remarkable, since the U.S. was by then still at war in Afghanistan 
which requires Army forces, while the U.S. Navy is largely dedicated to Asia. Furthermore, it 
explicitly mentions the need to counter Chinese anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/AD). 
This tendency is also apparent in the previously mentioned Air-Sea Battle doctrine from 2010. In 
the same year a Chinese official characterized the South China Sea as core interest, to which the 
U.S. responded that the freedom of navigation is a national security interest (Glain, 2011). 
China’s anti-access capability is a direct possible threat to the U.S. military strategy; to navigate 
freely throughout the region.  Moreover, it has triggered anxiety with regional allies (Holmes, 
2016). Anti-access/area denial is crucial in the understanding of Sino-American military relations 
in the Pacific. Dian (2015) writes, A2/AD is not only a threat to the U.S. or its allies national 
security. Rather, its threatening the American ‘control of the commons’. The commons are 
defined as air, sea, land, space and cyber domains and command means the control of who is 
using it. Therefore, a successful Chinese A2/AD domination in the region, would be detrimental 
to American power projection. In the 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept the projection of 
power into the region is listed as pivotal in US national interest:  
 
As a global power with global interests, the United States must maintain the credible 
 capability to project military force into any region of the world in support of those  
  interests. This includes the ability to project force both into the global commons to ensure
  their use and into foreign territory as required. Moreover, the credible ability to do so can 
  serve as a reassurance to U.S. partners and a powerful deterrent to those contemplating 
 actions that threaten U.S. interests. (US Department of Defense, 2012a)   
 
Hence, while A2/AD is possibly not directly threatening physical wellbeing of U.S citizens or its 
allies and it is moreover years from actually undermining U.S. commitments in the region 
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(Shambaugh, 2014), the issue of projecting power is portrayed as crucial to U.S. interest. In other 
words, a counter-measure against China’s A2/AD strategy is securitized. 
The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) strategy entails a hybrid integrated strategy to tackle A2/AD 
threats and while Washington claims it is not invented for a specific adversary, most scholars 
agree its primary focus is China (Stuart, 2012). The Air-Sea Battle doctrine was planned to be 
implemented even before the pivot, but was merged with it since the strategic objectives 
complement each other. Also, there has been debate about the budgetary implications. This new 
concept requires various advanced updates in equipment and material. As outlined in the policy 
paper by the DoD in 2012, it was proposed to redirect an amount of 268 million USD from Army 
and Land Marines budget to R&D compartments of the doctrine (Brimley & Ratner, 2013) and 
the dedication to the strategy by the administration is shown through the total budget allocation: 
over $500 billion through 2023 (Kazianis, 2014). That is remarkable, especially since the military 
budget of the U.S. was reduced every year of Obama’s first term (Appendix D). Therefore, one 
could possibly argue that allocating these kind of resources is prove of successful securitization, 
since it expanded outside the realm of ‘normal politics’. It was made into a security issue.  
 Overall, the DoD increased the military presence in the region. In 2012, Secretary of 
Defense Panetta (2012) announced in his speech in Shangri-La that the U.S. would revise its 
original 50/50 division of Maritime presence between the Atlantic and the Pacific to a 40/60 in 
favor of the Pacific, planned to be realized by 2020. According to several reports, the U.S. is on 
schedule. In 2012, estimated numbers U.S. military and civilian personnel in the Pacific were 
325.000. By 2015, this number was grown to 368.000. That same year, 55% of the Navy’s ships 
and 60% of the submarine fleet were already based in Asia. Some of its most advanced ships are 
sent to the region, such as the USS George Washington. In Appendix G, a graphic demonstrates 
the current employment in the Pacific.  
 Lastly, the Obama administration concluded various security agreements with regional 
allies. It installed an advanced missile system in South Korea and expanded its military bases in 
Australia, Japan and the Philippines, for example under the ‘Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement’ in 2014, where five bases close to the disputed regions in the South China Sea were 
expanded (Petras, 2016). Furthermore, Obama continued efforts started by Bush to diversify its 
partners, including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and New Zealand. According to congress, these 
agreements serve to improve military flexibility and enhance partners’ capabilities. However, it is 
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equally blunt to state “a driving force for these measures is China’s military modernization” 
(Manyin et al., 2012). Moreover, according to Xiang (2012) American leadership is keen on 
sensational advertising new military weaponry to deter possible rivals. Taking the earlier 
statement by DoD about projecting power into consideration, the military American strategy 
becomes rather clear. It is most likely not looking to clash with China. However, it does want to 
reaffirm its status as the controlling power of the Asia Pacific, both at home and to its allies.   
Therefore, the image is rather clear. However small the first steps were of the military 
rebalance, the U.S. has planned and approved large steps in the long-term to re-shift military 
attention to the Pacific region, which include a large increase in resources in times of budget cuts. 
As Shambaugh (2013) writes, it is not a fundamental shift, since even in the security sphere much 
is expanding or renewing old policies, but it is a relatively large one. Compared to other 
components within the pivot, it is safe to say that security initiatives gained a large deal of 
attention. However, the pivot did achieve more than solely security policy: America strengthened 
its multilateral cooperation in various schemes, it undertook various diplomatic efforts for better 
cooperation with neighboring countries and probably most importantly, it concluded efforts 
started by the Bush administration into the TPP (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). However, the 
amount of resources dedicated to the security sphere exceeds all the others (Manyin et al., 2012). 
Looking to what tangible results the re-balance brought, one has to look mostly to the security 
sphere (Manyin et al., 2012). 
 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
 In this section an elaborate trend analysis is provided with regard to military policy under 
Obama and previous administrations. This thesis aimed to outline the legacy Obama inherited 
from his predecessor in terms of military relations with China. It is important to take this into 
consideration when looking to possible securitization by Obama; as Balzacq (2015) wrote, it is 
pivotal to understand the contextual embeddedness of threat texts or speech acts. Therefore, to 
understand the meaning of Obama’s securitization, we have to understand what preceded.   
 Returning to the question this section started with: to what extent were security measures 
predominant in the pivot to Asia and were these significantly different from pre-existing policies?  
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It would be overstating by claiming that the re-balance to Asia is purely military oriented; there 
are various diplomatic, economic and political results which derived from the pivot. However, as 
this section has demonstrated, the security policies gained the majority of the resources and 
political attention in times off budgetary cuts in DoD spending. This demonstrates the priority the 
administration has given to this component within the pivot. Therefore, we can conclude by 
stating that security policies were in fact dominant within the pivot. Furthermore, this section has 
shown that when placing Obama’s security measures within its historical context, one can speak 
of a relative significant shift rather than a fundamental one. Other than Bush, Obama expanded 
existing military structures, redirected a substantial amount of deployed navy to the region and 
struck new military agreements with regional allies. Moreover, it dedicated a military doctrine to 
battle anti-access/area denial capabilities, which hints towards a warning to Beijing. It is 
important to note why the administration reversed existing policies and placed this much attention 
on military efforts. Drawing from the statement by the DoD about projecting power, it seems the 
administration was on one hand reaffirming its supremacy in the region both in the region and at 
home by partnerships and symbolic measures, while on the other one was indeed updating its 
military equipment and capabilities. The issue of the projection of power was framed as national 
interest, and therefore an issue of crucial importance.  
 Placing these findings under the lens of securitization, we have to look at the rear of the 
equation: what resulted from a possible securitization rather than how the issue was securitized 
(which will be discussed in the following chapter). Briefly put, can we label the military 
measures within the pivot as ‘extraordinary measures’ (Wæver, 1993)? As discussed in the 
theoretical framework, Hayes (2013) identified three processes in the process of conveying the 
perceived threat to the audience in securitization that construct the new reality: selection, 
legitimation, and implementation of extreme measures. Obama and his administration made the 
selection of the issue quite clear to the public: as Clinton (2011) wrote in her article 
“Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to 
global progress, […] through defending freedom of navigation” and later “Today, China 
represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States 
has ever had to manage”. But, maybe even more important, did the administration ‘implement 
extreme measures’? This chapter has argued that Obama’s policies were a significant change 
from pre-existing policies. However, it is questionable whether the term ‘extreme’ can be used 
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for the new direction of Obama, since it is for a large part an expansion of existing structures or 
re-shifting the balance to how military attention was before 9/11. Therefore, this thesis would 
prefer using the term ‘extraordinary measures’ over ‘extreme’. Moreover, as discussed earlier, 
securitization is not a binary issue; an issue can range from non-political, to politicized, to 
securitized (Buzan, et al., 1998). The pivot did entail significant military changes. The policies 
never took shape in large troop deployments or similar measures, but it did redirect a substantial 
part of its naval force to the region. Therefore, this chapter concludes by stating that Obama did 
implement extraordinary measures.  
 
5.3 Sub-Question 2:   
How did the U.S. legitimize the military component in the pivot to Asia? 
As explained in the theoretical framework, a securitization is dependent on whether that 
message is received and accepted by its audience. Therefore, this section will outline a discourse 
analysis, including several governmental policy papers and speeches by both Obama and other 
cabinet officials. In the analysis specific focus is placed on how military components within the 
pivot are legitimized as policy. According to Wæver (1995), if an issue is successfully 
securitized, normal politics are suspended to be replaced by extraordinary measures. In the 
previous section this thesis concluded that the military policies within the pivot can be 
characterized as extraordinary to some extent. However, this section will focus on the ‘threat’ 
that forms the legitimization of these policies.  
While the  widely cited article by Hillary Clinton (2011) in Foreign Policy is often 
marked as the start of the pivot, these section begins it analysis in 2009 when Obama was 
inaugurated. Sino-American relations were already changing and tensions with China rose 
quickly in the years that followed. The structure of this section is as follows; first a policy, or 
statement is presented in its context. Subsequently, the specific discourse to legitimize this action 
is highlighted and analyzed.  
5.3.1 The build-up to the pivot 
In November 2009 by then still Senator Barack Obama visited China to discuss several 
transnational issues such as trade, climate change and nuclear proliferation. He was the first 
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American president(elect) to visit China in his first year in office. Yet, during his election, 
Obama proved himself critical on China, mainly directed towards their economic policy: China is 
“grossly undervaluing their currency and giving their goods yet another unfair advantage” 
(Obama, 2008). Unsurprisingly, Obama gained little out of his 2009 trip to China and returned 
empty-handed despite hoping to reach an agreement on proliferation of Iran (Cooper, 2009). 
Later that year, when China backed out the climate agreement, the complex Sino-Amercan 
relationship became more apparent . A crucial event is the 6.4 billion USD arms deal with 
Taiwan in 2010, which spiked outrage in China. In a reaction, Beijing suspended military visits 
and placed sanctions on U.S. companies processing the deal. The U.S. Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (2010) announced the deal:  
This proposed sale serves U.S. national, economic, and security interests by supporting 
 the recipient’s continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and enhance its defensive 
 capability. The proposed sale will help improve the security of the recipient and assist in 
 maintaining political stability, military balance, and economic progress in the region. 
It is important to note that it is explicitly mentioned that this sale is projected to serve the U.S. 
security interests. The Secretary of Defense Robert Gates goes even further stating that the anti-
ship weaponry of China "could threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies 
in the Pacific -- in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups" (Pomfret, 2010). 
Lastly, that same year Clinton marked the new stance on China vividly in stating that “The 
United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to 
Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea” (Clinton, 
2010). It goes without saying that this message was received with concerns in Beijing. The South 
China Sea was by then already a crux in China’s policies and the U.S. was on all fronts 
reasserting China’s neighboring countries with competing territorial claims of American support. 
In the same speech she mentioned “The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence 
building measures consistent with the declaration” (Clinton 2010). When she visited Hanoi in 
2011, she named the sea ‘the West Philippine Sea’ (Clinton, 2011b), arguably deliberate 
provoking China. 
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5.3.2 Securitizing the pivot in the first term 
 For the pivot itself, this thesis takes Clinton’s (2011a) widely cited article America’s 
Pacific Century in Foreign Policy as starting point. Elaborately discussed previously, it is also 
important to note the continuation of previous outlets: “Strategically, maintaining peace and 
security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through 
defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, […] or ensuring transparency in the 
military activities of the region’s key players” (Clinton, 2011a). However she also alters 
conciliatory wordings, the above reads as a clear warning signal, and also as an explanation of a 
new direction. It was directly followed by the statement by Obama in Australia that cuts in 
military spending will not come at the expense of U.S. military presence in the region. Overall, 
statements by government officials in 2011 were of a cautionary nature, emphasizing the need for 
military cooperation, while hinting Beijing to stop provocations.  
 In 2012, commentators in the PRC criticized the pivot heavily, stating that the whole 
policy is a concealed containment strategy of China’s interests (Lawrence, 2013). In the strategic 
guidance paper by the Department of Defense of that year, Obama stated:  
We will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of 
 contingencies. In particular, we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future 
 success, including intelligence, surveillance, and  reconnaissance; counterterrorism; 
 countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and 
 prevailing in all domains, including cyber (Obama’s note in U.S. Department of Defense, 
 2012).  
 
Explicitly mentioning anti-access warfare is a direct reference to Beijing. Also, a stark message is 
formulated in that the U.S. will be ready for the full range of contingencies, which can be 
interpreted as a full-out war. 
 
Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to 
 affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. However, the growth of 
 China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions 
 in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make 
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 the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to 
 operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law (U.S. 
 Department of Defense, 2012b, p.2) 
 
It is important to note an important subtle change in rhetoric. Previously, statements mostly 
included the security of the region as motivator. Here, China is portrayed as an actor who can 
threaten U.S. national security. This functions as the legitimation of policies beyond the ordinary 
political sphere. Hence, national security is threatened. Furthermore, ‘regional access’ and 
‘operate freely’ quite clearly refers to the disputed territories in the South China Sea. Lastly, the 
paper emphasizes the military rise of China and express its concerns over future capabilities. 
Thus, another legitimation for extraordinary measures. 
 
States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our 
 power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and 
 technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will 
 invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial
 (A2/AD) environments. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012b, p. 4) 
 
Later that year, the U.S. concluded a deal with Japan to install an advanced missile-defense radar 
system on Japanese territory. It spiked outrage in the public debate in Beijing. The territorial 
dispute around the South China Sea fast-tracked spiral down in 2012 (see Appendix H). Several 
incidents in 2012  in violation of international law in which Beijing was often involved, put the 
atmosphere on edge (Kaplan, 2014). 
5.3.3 Securitizing the pivot in the second term 
After re-election, the pivot to Asia continued. The formerly classified Air-Sea Battle strategy 
was made publicly in 2013. In short, the concept was completely dedicated as an operational 
approach to an A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) environment (Callaway, 2014), which most 
scholars interpret as an anti-Beijing strategy (Ford, 2017). Obama’s now former Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, mentions bluntly in his memoires that China’s militarization poses a threat 
to the U.S. national security. He states that their military capabilities are “designed to keep U.S. 
air and naval assets well east of the South China Sea and Taiwan” (Gates, 2014). Thus, he 
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implies that China is arranging their military specifically around keeping U.S. forces away from 
free passage. With that, U.S. interests are at stake.  
However 2013 disputes in the South China Sea continued, bilateral Sino-American relations 
improved slightly. In June, Obama hosted Xi Jinping in California for their first lengthy talk. 
Topics to be discussed were cybercrime and the territorial disputes. Joseph Nye stated it was “the 
most important meeting between an American and Chinese president, since Nixon and Mao”. 
Although results of the meeting were arguably slim (Sanger, 2013), it is consistent in a new 
chapter within the pivot policy. Various scholars have argued Obama took a more pragmatic 
approach in his second term, reducing strong rhetoric and being more focused on the other 
compartments of the pivot-strategy. It is widely assumed he wanted to re-build an constructive 
relation with Beijing (Sutter, Brown, Adamson, Mochizuki & Ollapally, 2013; Saunders, 2014).  
Yet, incidents within the South China Sea continued. In 2014, while radar satellites showed 
China’s efforts to build artificial islands, Obama signed a 10 year US-Philippines Enhanced 
Defense Co-operation Agreement, including troop and ship rotation in the Philippines. He stated: 
Deepening our alliance is part of our broader vision for the Asia Pacific. We believe that 
nations and peoples have the right to live in security and peace, and to have their sovereignty 
and territorial integrity respected.  We believe that international law must be upheld, that 
freedom of navigation must be preserved and commerce must not be impeded. We believe 
that disputes must be resolved peacefully and not by intimidation or force […]Let me be 
absolutely clear.  For more than 60 years, the United States and the Philippines have been 
bound by a mutual defense treaty.  And this treaty means our two nations pledge -- and I’m 
quoting -- our “common determination to defend themselves against external armed attacks, 
so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone.”  In 
other words, our commitment to defend the Philippines is ironclad and the United States will 
keep that commitment, because allies never stand alone (Obama, 2014).  
It is quite clear that if Obama actually wanted to change tone, he did not succeed vigorously. The 
above has several references to China: territorial integrity, international law, freedom of 
navigation and the depicted intimidation. He closes with a full-scale threat to possible aggressors 
that war with the Philippines will mean war with America. Later that year, a U.S. Navy aircraft is 
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intercepted by the Chinese and the Philippines conduct a joint military exercise with the U.S. In 
2015 the DoD published the policy paper Asia-Pacific: Maritime Security Strategy. The paper 
starts off immediately expressing the importance of freedom of navigation while simultaneously 
stretching the concept:  
Freedom of the seas, however, includes more than the mere freedom of commercial vessels to 
transit through international waterways. While not a defined term under international law, the 
Department uses “freedom of the seas” to mean all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of 
the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, recognized under international 
law. Freedom of the seas is thus also essential to ensure access in the event of a crisis. 
Conflicts and disasters can threaten U.S. interests and those of our regional allies and partners 
(USA Department of Defense, 2015, p.2) 
 
This statement is pivotal, since this utterance of discourse seems a perfect fit for securitization: 
freedom of the seas is now loaded with far-reaching extra dimensions. Now, the usage of freedom 
of the seas is a requisite for U.S. national security, because it is “essential in the event of a crisis”. 
Therefore, anyone who obstructs the freedom of the seas (free passage in the South China Sea) is 
as of now threatening U.S. security.  It re-emphasizes the U.S. security interest in the matter 
again while simultaneously subtly hinting to China’s obstructive behavior: “As the maritime 
security environment continues to evolve, this task is becoming more challenging. But there 
should be no doubt that the United States will maintain the necessary military presence and 
capabilities to  protect our interests and those of our allies and partners against potential threats in 
the maritime domain” (Department of Defense, 2015). Further, it strongly emphasizes the need 
for parties involved in the territorial dispute, to take international law (UNCLOS) in 
consideration. On the militarization of China’s navy the following is mentioned: 
Although preparation for a potential Taiwan conflict remains the primary driver of 
 Chinese investment, China is also placing emphasis on preparing for contingencies in the 
 East and South China Sea. China sees a need for the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
 (PLAN) to be able to support China’s “new historic missions” […]. (USA Department of 
 Defense, 2015, p. 10) 
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It is noteworthy since it asserts Beijing’s intentions for its audience; China is militarizing for a 
conflict with Taiwan (thus this is to be expected), but also readies to fight anyone in the seas 
(while it is previous mentioned the U.S. has a strong presence there) in new historic missions. By 
linking this grandiloquent statement to a navy force that is preparing for contingencies, an image 
rises of a battle of unprecedented proportion is coming. The paper than announces several 
important deployments of some of its most advanced ships and building new ones to the region in 
the next 5 years to “protect the ability to respond decisively”, increasing the total number of ships 
by 30% (USA Department of Defense, 2015). Harris, a senior navy officer stated the following 
alongside Carter, the new Secretary of Defense: “We want to cooperate with China in all domains 
as much as possible, so we have to have a view, and I have a view of cooperation where we can, 
but we have to confront them if we must.” (Freedberg, 2016). Carter himself called the region 
“the most consequential region for America’s future” and therefore military presence was of 
“fundamental strategic importance to our country”. According to Carter, the U.S. is going to 
“sharpen its military edge” (McKirdy, 2016). 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
Overlooking almost two terms by Obama, this thesis concludes the following in regard to 
securitization. The U.S. at first seemingly tried to refrain from choosing sides in territorial 
disputes, but over the years the anti-Beijing rhetoric within speeches and governmental 
publications became progressively apparent. Freedom of navigation became key subject for the 
U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, thereby pointing out that rules should apply to all, subtly 
referring to China, who does not play by the rules according to U.S. standards.   
Moreover, the pivot were not only words on paper. The legitimization of these security 
measured followed one of two pathways: (1) either stating the dedication of the U.S. to its allies 
and the dependence on the U.S. for a safe region, or (2) emphasizing that a Chinese controlled 
region was threatening the national security. The second one is slightly paraphrased, but rooted in 
the argumentation that the U.S. should always be able to navigate freely throughout the region in 
maintaining it national security. Therefore, Beijing’s claims over territorial waters were 
threatening the U.S. interest.   
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The main critiques from the audience (the American public) in securitizing the pivot, was 
that Obama’s harsh policies could have led to a more assertive China and that the Asia Pacific 
took too much of Obama attention as opposed to other regions (Manyin et al., 2012; Ford, 2017). 
However, overall the pivot was never resisted on large scale such as the invasion in Iraq by the 
previous administration. Obviously, the pivot never resulted in armed conflict, but came 
disturbingly close at times. It is notably that Obama changed the Asia Pacific region into a top 
military priority, without getting too much resistance. One could argue that the constant depiction 
of the pivot to Asia as crucial for national security did succeed in transferring that message.  
5.4 Sub-Question 3:   
How did Beijing respond militarily to the securitization of the pivot? 
 For the last sub-question, this thesis solely focuses on the military response by Beijing. If 
Obama succeeded in securitizing Chinese policies regarding the South China Sea, he created a 
reality in which China has to respond. Scholars have linked the development of the ‘New Silk 
Road’ as a counter response to the American pivot (Clark, 2010), but this section will solely 
analyze the military aspects of China’s policies, rather than diplomatic or economic initiatives. It 
should be noted that this thesis will refrain from discussing whether the Beijing leadership 
perceived the pivot as containment or not, but rather analyzes how Beijing responded to the pivot 
militarily and strive to place that historical context. As mentioned before, Beijing is less 
transparent on military documents and therefore the number of sources for this section is limited.   
5.4.1 The modernization of the Chinese army 
 The modernization of the Chinese military (PLA) dates back to several decades 
before the pivot. Already during the 1970s the leadership in Beijing realized China needed to 
update its military capacity to become a modern military force. It encompassed all four 
components of the army; navy, air force, strategic missile force and ground army (Blasko, 2005). 
Moreover, as Scobell and Nathan (2012), the PLA has served as more than a fighting force, often 
responsible for political and economic responsibilities. The modernization of the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) stands out as a particular trend, motivated by several 
developments. As presented in the white paper The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue 
(2000) by the Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, deterring Taiwan formed a key 
driver to modernize its navy. However, coinciding with the ‘go-out strategy’ to encourage 
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overseas enterprises during the 1990s, China must have realized the need for naval capacity to 
project power across the seas (Lim, 2011), while also adjusting to potential conflict close to its 
borders, with most likely opponent the United States in case of a Taiwan conflict (Scobell and 
Nathan, 2012). According to Lim (2011), the large acquisition of submarines can be seen as a 
preventive measure to address a possible U.S. intervention. Furthermore, as the same article 
shows, Beijing realized already in the 1970s, when territorial disputes began over the East and 
South China Sea, that the PLAN must be ready to assist when necessary (Scobell and Nathan, 
2012). Lastly, Beijing must anticipate an U.S. intervention with a possible blockade of the 
Malacca Strait, through which most of China’s oil is imported (the so-called ‘Malacca Dilemma’) 
(Cheng, 2015). A response to this scenario was the development of the previously discussed anti-
access /area denial strategy (A2/AD) (Scobell and Nathan, 2012).   
The modernization of China’s navy took off during the mid-1990s and accelerated in the 
21st century. It entailed a broad array of weapons acquisition programs, such as anti-ship ballistic 
missiles, submarines and surface ships. In a detailed report by O’Rourke (2017), he describes 
thoroughly how China in short time took on an all-encompassing modernization strategy for its 
navy. Several of its major improvements were implemented after the publishing of Clinton’s 
article, announcing the re-balance to Asia. However, while China is vastly modernizing its 
military capacity, the U.S. still has larger military budgets and a superior military presence in the 
South China Sea. China spends roughly $150 billion on military while the U.S. spends almost 
$600 billion. Appendix I and J depict the same image; China spends relatively less compared to 
their GDP on military than the United States. However the Chinese budgetary request in 2017 for 
military was an increase of 7% , it is the lowest increase in 7 years due to a stagnating economy.  
 
5.4.2 The Chinese response to the pivot 
 One month after Obama’s inauguration in 2009, Chinese media reported intensively an 
interception of an American surveillance ship. While the U.S. was monitoring the Chinese 
military for a longer period, never did China take such drastic steps on account of its proclaimed 
sovereignty (Zhao, 2015). Since then, China’s foreign policy is often described as ‘a new 
assertiveness’ by U.S. analysts (Putra, 2015). However, as Johnston (2013) points out, this 
rhetoric lacks inclusion of previous stances by China, and are mostly based on seven incidents 
that happened in that period (such as the previous discussed Taiwan arms deal in 2010, or 
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labelling the South China Sea as ‘core interest’). While several of these seven incidents are 
attributed to an earlier foreign policy (‘old assertiveness’), the South China Sea issue does 
illustrate a new policy direction. China undertook more military patrols, more risky action to 
protect fisheries and hardline rhetoric towards other claimants. However, depicting the Beijing’s 
complete foreign policy as newly assertive, would be false (Johnston, 2013).   
  In assessing the Chinese reaction to the pivot, it is important to distinct government 
officials, high-profile commentators and low-level commentators. Or as Swaine (2012) does, 
authoritative, quasi-authoritative and non-authoritative. Focusing on the former, public reaction 
to policies regarding the pivot were rare and relatively restraint, while quasi- and non-
authoritative assessments were far more alarming and suspicious towards the United States. 
However, a shared counsel by all was restraint and caution rather than ‘assertive realpolitik’ 
(Swaine, 2012). Nevertheless, it is quite clear Beijing is somewhat suspicious about the 
motivation behind some parts of the pivot, such as the projected 60% navy presence and 
interference with territorial disputes (Atia, 2016).  
 As mentioned, China did employ a ‘new assertiveness’ in regard to the South China Sea. 
Starting onwards from 2011, China clashed multiple times with neighboring countries concerning 
fishing ships, warships and monitoring instruments. In 2014 the Philippines brought China in 
front of the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning the legality its ‘nine-dotted line’ 
sovereignty claim (see Appendix H). Around that same time China started building artificial 
islands in the Spratly and Paracel island groups. In 2015, Beijing published its first defense white 
paper focused exclusively on strategy. Whereas it also continues previous efforts of ‘active 
defense’ it now also emphasizes high-sea offensive naval operations. More importantly, the 
South China Sea’s territorial disputes were now classified as ‘core interest’ (Woody, 2015). 
However Johnston (2013) states that this is founded in miscommunication, it did find its way 
back to U.S. analysts and government, and is a key example of a securitization. Claiming it as 
‘core interest’, one automatically commits to full dedication. The assumption that, not following 
up on core interests, would mean an ‘existential threat’ is easy to make. China stated the 
following on the matter in its white paper: 
 
 On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, 
  some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military 
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 presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external 
 countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant 
 close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a long-
 standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests (PRC Ministry of 
 National Defense, 2015).  
 
Reading between the lines, it is clear who is meant by ‘external country’. The paper also calls to 
prepare for ‘military struggle’ in China’s water backyard. It is unsurprising that in this Chinese 
‘speech act’ the emphasis is more on sovereignty than on the American side, since potential 
conflict would be close to Chinese borders, but more importantly, because of the role sovereignty 
plays in Chinese foreign policy. The paper makes it also clear that China will continue to further 
develop its naval capacity in the future to be able to deploy its force further from home. It is also 
notable that the paper changed the traditional ‘active defense’ (strike back when you are hit) to a 
more pro-active stance:  
 
In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, 
 the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the 
 combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with open seas protection, and build a 
 combined, multi-functional and efficient marine force structure” (Johnson, 2015).  
 
While this shift in military policy is significant, it is important to note that ‘offshore water 
defense’, defending China’s territory close to its borders such as the South China Sea, remains 
the primary focus of the PLAN. Already in the defense white paper of 2004, the PRC stated the 
following:  
While continuing to attach importance to the building of the Army, the PLA gives priority 
 to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery force to seek balanced 
 development of the combat force structure, in order to strengthen the capabilities for 
 winning both command of the sea and command of the air, and conducting strategic 
 counter strikes (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2004) 
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Offshore defense, or as it is labelled by the Pentagon, A2/AD, is the joint strategy of the PLA to 
stop potential approaching hostile forces far from the mainland (anti-access), or deny already 
closely stationed forces (such as the U.S.) operational action (area-denial) (McDevitt, 2016). 
China has been building new ships in an incredible (or one might say ‘extraordinary’) pace. Clark 
and Wilson (2017) add that China’s shipbuilding priorities confirm the assessment that it will 
stay focused primarily on its near seas, but might shift more resources towards far sea capabilities 
in the long-term, especially in the context of the newly proposed Maritime Silk Road initiative 
(McDevitt, 2016).       
Over the course of 2016 incidents over the South China Sea between China and the U.S. 
continued. Various scholars agree that at least a part of China’s military strategy is designed to 
cope with a possible U.S. conflict (Clark & Wilson, 2017; Xiang, 2012). However, this does not 
mean China is looking for conflict. As Zhao (2015) argues, both Washington and Beijing are 
adjusting to a new power-relationship, where conflict must be avoided, but interests are defended.  
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
 This section has given a historical analysis of the modernization of the Chinese military, 
so that policies regarding the South China Sea can be seen in its historical context. Without this 
analysis, it is hard to separate pre-existing policies from responses to the pivot. It has described 
the differences in public opinion over various layers of society (quasi/non-authoritative and 
authoritative). This is important, since the positional power of the actor making the ‘threat’, is a 
key component (Stritzel, 2007). Furthermore, this section has provided an overview of specific 
policies that can to some extent be attributed as a response to the American pivot.   
 China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has gone through a rapid modernization since 
the mid-1990s. However other factors have played a large role in this, possible conflict with the 
U.S. came rather quickly on the agenda. Since the pivot, Chinese foreign policy has been 
described often as a new ‘assertiveness’. However, for several cases this assertiveness is hardly 
new, but date back in its original doctrine of sovereignty. Nonetheless, its increased actions in the 
South China Sea are a shift from previous leaderships. China’s leadership refrains from too stark 
accusations, but condemns the U.S. in similar phrasing in the accusation of breaking the rules 
(Needham, 2017). At the same time, Chinese opinion-makers, media and army officials do make 
more bold claims, such as the likelihood of war being ‘a reality’ (Sanger & Davis, 2015). 
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 The modernization of the navy dates back to before Obama’s tenure and therefore is not a 
response to the pivot. Nonetheless, China has increasingly turned its modernization towards a 
force that might be ready for conflict with the United States, especially through its A2/AD 
strategy. Furthermore, when China published its defense white paper in 2015, Washington 
interpreted China’s claim in the South China Sea as one of its ‘core interests’, and therefore vital 
to its status quo. Additionally, Beijing made it clear it is preparing for expansionist navy 
employments (open seas). In sum, possibly by mistake, China acted within the newly constructed 
reality by the Obama administration, which uplifted China’s military policies regarding the South 
China Sea as security issue. 
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusion & discussion 
The main objective of this research was to research the approach by the Obama 
administration towards re-establishing military force in the Asia Pacific. The so-called pivot to 
Asia is a significant aspect in the foreign policy of two terms served by Obama. Scholars have 
claimed it was his biggest mistake, others have praised his efforts to assure allies in the Pacific of 
American support. From the offset, the military component within the pivot found its way easier 
to the media and academic literature than other compartments. Instead of assessing the ‘grand 
strategy’ by Obama, this research addresses the way the Obama administration legitimized the 
military component within the pivot and if this was exceptional in its context. Therefore, this 
thesis utilized securitization theory, debating if Obama lifted threats into the security realm to 
legitimize exceptional measures. Furthermore, it applied this theoretical lens to discuss how 
discourse is able to create a reality in which the counterpart (China) now also has to operate. 
This thesis has argued that the military component was in fact predominant in the pivot; 
especially during the first years. The military component outreached other aspects such as 
economy and diplomacy in terms of resources and attention. Coinciding with China looking to 
expand its sphere of influence, both governments had a dual balancing relationship: economically 
cooperating, while militarily competing.  
Chapter 5 first provided the contextual analysis in terms of military policy in the region; 
what situation did Obama inherit from his predecessor and to what extent are his policies within 
the pivot exceptional? The change in military policy implemented by Obama was a significant 
break; re-directing deployed navy to the region, update material and conclude various military 
agreements with neighboring countries. The administration made sure the cuts in military 
budgets, did not come at the expense of military re-balancing to Asia. If a securitization is 
successful, an actor would be able to implement ‘extraordinary’ measures (Wæver, 1993). 
Therefore, in the hypothesis that Obama securitized Chinese policies to implement the pivot, 
these policies within the pivot had to be ‘extraordinary’. Hence, how would it otherwise differ 
from regular politics? Taken the historical context (‘embeddedness in existing discourse’) in 
consideration of the Obama administration, this thesis has concluded that Obama did implement 
‘extraordinary measures’.  
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  Furthermore, this thesis analyzed the legitimization of these measures in speeches and 
publications by the administrations. In these outputs, legitimization is provided through a 
existential threat to U.S interests. It is interesting to note that Chinese policies regarding the 
South China Sea are articulated through various threats by the administration: China’s growing 
military capabilities, accusations of breaking international law, threats to the U.S. projection of 
power, claimed commitment to regional allies and most notably, the freedom of navigation are 
exploited in legitimizing Obama’s securitization. As stated, some of these developments (like the 
military modernization) date back from far longer than the pivot, but still are portrayed as urgent 
threats that have to be dealt with in a timely manner, fitting perfectly within securitization theory 
(Buzan & Wæver, 2003). These threats are conveyed by actors in a position of power. Whether 
this accusations (or speech acts) are true or not is irrelevant. By stating that U.S. security is being 
threatened, the administration created that reality (Stritzel, 2007).   
Lastly, this thesis has strived to outline the military developments on the Chinese side. As 
stated before, by constructing a new reality through discourse and non-discursive measures, one 
obliges the other to act within that same reality. While modernization of China’s navy has various 
drivers and started long before the pivot, most scholars agree that there is at least a component 
within Chinese maritime strategy that adjusts to possible Sino-American conflict (for example in 
the A2/AD strategy). It proves that also China reacts within the reality that Washington has 
constructed, namely that China’s South China Sea policies are a top-security issue for the United 
States. Therefore, the securitization is not only credibly conveyed to the intended audience (the 
American public), but also to the Chinese counterpart, which responds in its turn in that same 
reality.  
In sum, this thesis has argued that Obama did securitize South China Sea policies of 
China. It aimed to contribute to the body of literature on securitization theory, U.S. foreign policy 
and Sino-American  military relations. It hopes to trigger a renewed debate on the utility of the 
theory, by applying it to worldly issues. Lastly, it has analyzed a part of Obama’s foreign policy 
through an unique angle. While he did manage to re-balance to Asia, Obama was never the first 
American ‘Pacific President’ and there will most likely never be one.   
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Appendix C: U.S. Troops Overseas 1950-2005, by region 
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Appendix D: United States military spending in millions USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
 
 
YEAR AMOUNT 
  
1996 410141 
1997 408020 
1998 398803 
1999 399787 
2000 415259 
2001 418631 
2002 470042 
2003 534984 
2004 583090 
2005 610898 
2006 620387 
2007 636674 
2008 683776 
2009 738621 
2010 758890 
2011 749533 
2012 706918 
2013 650851 
2014 610636 
2015 596010 
2016 606233 
CURRENT  611186 
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Appendix E: Military spending U.S. by year in million USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
 
 
 
Ivo Leijten 
 THE PACIFIC PRESIDENT 
 
 
61 
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Appendix H: Territorial claims in the South China Sea 
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Appendix I: Military Spending as Percentage of Government Spending of the U.S. and 
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Appendix J: Military Spending as Percentage of GDP of the U.S. and China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SIPRI Milex Database 
 
